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1 Introduction
Tax non-compliance – avoidance and evasion – is a problem of great importance for many
countries. For example, the US Internal Revenue Service estimated that about 17% of
due income taxes are not paid (IRS, 2007), while according to the HM-Treasury report
(HMRC, 2007), the VAT gap is about 14.2% in the UK.
Tax non-compliance does not only reduce tax revenue (ceteris paribus) but has a
number of other welfare-reducing consequences.1
² The loss of tax revenue means that governments either have to spend less on de-
sirable publicly provided goods and services or else are forced to increase the tax
burdens on compliant tax payers, thus amplifying the deadweight loss.2
² The government’s inability to collect su¢cient tax revenue may result in a higher
de…cit and a deterioration of the …nancial environment. In extreme cases, it may
cause …nancial crises, as in Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2002.
² Signi…cant amounts of real resources are devoted to both devising tax reducing
schemes and to the monitoring and enforcement of tax compliance.
² Non-compliance typically results in otherwise identical taxpayers facing arbitrar-
ily di¤erent e¤ective marginal tax rates – which violates a standard condition of
e¢cient taxation and thus increases the distortions of the tax system.
² Since rich individuals are probably more likely to employ avoidance practices,3 the
government levies heavier taxes on those who are less well-o¤, which will not only
1For a detailed overview of the main problems related to tax compliance, see Andreoni, Erard and
Feinstein (1998).
2Feldstein (1999) estimates the deadweight loss from income tax in the US to be more than twelve
times larger than it would have been without tax avoidance.
3Lang at al. (1997), which is based on German data, concluded that "the di¤erence between legislative
and e¤ective tax rate increases in gross income up to the eight income decile and remains at the maximum
di¤erence of about 16% for the ninth and the tenth decile". See also Agell and Persson (2000) for the
avoidance practice within the di¤erent income groups in Sweden, while Feinstein (1991) …nds a similar
relation for TCMP audit …ndings in 1982 and 1985. Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) and Desai (2005) also
indicate that corporate tax avoidance activities are more likely to be undertaken by larger …rms.
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increase vertical inequality but may slow down the development of small businesses
and economic growth.
² It is also important to recognise that non-compliance can have a multiplier e¤ect to
the extent that non-compliance by a small group of individuals diminishes the social
norm of tax compliance in the wider population of otherwise compliant taxpayers.
The importance of such norms has been emphasised in a number of behavioural and
experimental studies (Gordon, 1989; Cowell, 1992; Myles and Naylor, 1996; Kim,
2003).
While it is thus important to more fully understand the drivers of tax non-compliance,
much of the literature has focused on taxpayer behaviour – the demand side of non-
compliance – using either the conventional Allingham-Sandmo model or some other
decision-theoretic approach. It is now generally recognised that non-compliance has both
a supply side and a demand side, and that more attention needs to be paid to the sup-
ply side. Indeed, Joel Slemrod (2004) considers the ignorance of the supply side of tax
non-compliance to be a signi…cant shortcoming of traditional economic models, especially
in relation to corporate tax behaviour, and points out that the market for tax abusive
schemes has grown substantially in recent years.4
One aspect of the supply side that has been widely studied is the role of agents/tax
preparers who may inform the clients of tax saving opportunities. For example, Erard
(1993) shows that the non-compliance on returns prepared by certi…ed public accountant
and lawyers is approximately 4.5 times larger than it would have been had their clients
prepared their own tax returns. Another aspect focuses on how taxes could be evaded
by bribing the tax inspector5 or even a member of parliament to issue the right tax
4The large importance of the disclosure of the tax avoidance schemes has been recognised by HMRC
and postulated in Part 7 of the Finance Act 2004. Similarly, the Internal Revenue Service proclaimed
that one of its priorities in 2008 is to combat abusive tax avoidance schemes and the individuals who
promote them (IRS 2008).
5Chander and Wilde (1992) and Hindriks et al (1999) cite di¤erent sources and provide outrageous
evidence of tax corruption in India, Nepal, Thailand and Taiwan. Hindriks at al (1999), for example,
write that surveys in Taiwan "report 94% of interviewees as having been ’led to’ bribe corrupt tax admin-
istrators and 80% of certi…ed public accountants as admitting to bribing tax o¢cials" and "con…dential
survey as …nding that 76% of all government tax auditors took bribes and 68% of tax payers had paid
3
exemption.6
In this paper, the focus is on another aspect of supply – the existence of an imperfectly
competitive industry that devises and sells tax minimisation schemes. Certainly, in many
advanced economies, the market seems to be dominated by a relatively small number
of large players. For instance, in the UK, this would be the “Big Four” accountancy
…rms (KPMG, Ernst and Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte), which often face
criticism for the provision of tax shelters for wealthy individuals and business corporations
(see, for example, The Financial Times May 10, 2004).
Within such a perspective, a crucial factor determining the amount of non-compliance
is the equilibrium price for these schemes. Now, it is well known from the traditional
Industrial Organization literature that the equilibrium price depends on certain features
of the industry demand curve. For example, Anderson and Régis (2003) show that the
more convex is the industry demand function, the lower will be the equilibrium price
and the higher the equilibrium quantity. Similarly, Sandmo (1971) and Coes (1977) have
shown that the supplier reduces the quantity when facing higher uncertainty/inequality
in demand.
The aim of this paper is to explore what factors a¤ect the shape of the demand curve
for the tax minimisation industry and hence, the equilibrium price and output. We will
investigate how the shape of the demand curve depends on
(i) the progressivity of the tax schedule;
(ii) the level of inequality of the pre-tax distribution of income;
(iii) the shape of penalty and monitoring functions.
A number of important implications will be discussed.
² One of the most important issues is that in a wide class of cases, a greater progres-
sivity of the tax schedule may reduce the supply of tax avoidance/evasion schemes.
Conversely, the ‡atter the schedule, the lower is the equilibrium price of tax min-
bribes". For the tax moral in Latin America, see Torgler (2005).
6The harm from legal tax exemption could be very signi…cant for a national tax revenue. For example,
according to Åslund (1999), three tax exemptions only cost the Russian federal budget more than 7% of
GDP: the tax grant to the natural gas monopoly company Gazprom at the end of 1993 (2% of GDP);
the secured tax exemptions for the metallurgical industry (2% of GDP) and the National Sports Fund’s
right to import alcohol and tobacco without tax (3% of GDP).
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imisation schemes and hence, the greater is the level of non-compliance. This result
is very important because the presumption is often the other way around – the re-
sponse to avoidance/evasion is to have a very ‡at schedule (see, for example, Tanzi
and Zee, 2000).
² In a wide class of cases, there will be greater tax compliance in economies with a
higher level of inequality in pre-tax income.
² Finally, we will show how, given the tax code and pre-tax income distribution, the
government can in‡uence the shape of the demand curve for tax evasion and hence,
the proportion of non-compliant taxpayers by suitably designing the shape of the
monitoring and penalty functions.
The intuition behind these …rst two results is the following. The more equal are tax
duties – which can arise by having either a more progressive tax schedule or a more
equal distribution of pre-tax income – the more elastic is demand and thus, the greater
is the incentive of suppliers of tax schemes to cut prices to attract a larger share of the
population to buy their tax scheme. Conversely, the more unequal are tax duties, the
more can be gained by targeting the rich (or those who are ready to pay much more) at
a higher price.
We will show that the main results are robust to di¤erent assumptions about the
nature of market structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general model and
characterises the equilibrium price and output of tax reduction schemes. Section 3 derives
the main comparative static results and, in particular, the link between tax compliance
and both the progressivity of the tax schedule and the degree of income inequality. Section
4 considers two extensions of the previous analysis: …rst we show how a tax authority
can in‡uence the level of compliance through the design of its monitoring and penalty
regimes and second we show how the analysis can be generalised to di¤erent forms of
payment schedules. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 The model
2.1 The demand side
We begin by exploring the demand side of the tax minimization industry and investigate
how this is a¤ected by factors such as the distribution of pre-tax income, the tax code,
and the shape of the audit probability and penalty functions.
2.1.1 Individual demand
There is a continuum of taxpayers that di¤ers in only the pre-tax level, , of some tax base,
which could be earned income, pro…t, bequest etc. We will refer to  as income in the rest
of the text. While the income earned by a particular household is private information, we
assume the cumulative distribution function of income,  (), to be common knowledge.
For simplicity, we assume that income is distributed over the …nite interval [ ]. We
assume that  () is di¤erentiable and strictly increasing. Let () =  0() denote the
associated density function with ()  0 8  2 [ ].
The government determines the tax code, (), which we take to be exogenous,7 a
positive and increasing function relating the level of tax duties to income. For simplicity,
we will also assume it to be continuously di¤erentiable.
There is an industry supplying a single tax scheme8 that helps taxpayers reduce the
amount of tax they pay by some constant proportion   2 [0 1].
However, the particular method of tax reduction may not be perfectly safe, and we
assume there to be some probability  0 ·  · 1 that the taxpayer will be subjected
to audit and, if audited, the scheme will be deemed to constitute tax evasion in which
case the taxpayer will have to repay the tax plus a penalty. This interpretation of 
enables us to encompass a range of possible types of schemes that might be supplied
by the market. At one extreme, there is the case considered in most of the existing
literature of schemes that are known to constitute pure tax evasion with certainty and, in
7Roine (2007) and Borck (2006) analyse the property of the a¢ne tax code which results from a
voting over redistribution when tax avoidance and evasion are present. Damjanovic (2001) investigated
the properties of the optimal tax code design in an economy with a monopolistic tax avoidance provider.
8In a related paper, Ulph (2008) analyses the case where the tax advice industry provides a variety
of di¤erentiated products ranging from tax planning through avoidance to evasion.
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this case,  is just the audit probability. At the other extreme, schemes that are known
to constitute tax planning or pure tax avoidance with certainty will be perfectly legal
and so  = 0, irrespective of the audit probability. More generally, schemes may fall into
a grey area where their legality may be a matter of judgement, or may depend on the
precise way in which they are implemented and, in this case,  will be the product of the
audit probability and the probability of being judged to be illegal conditional on being
audited. IRS (2008) provides examples of such schemes.
Following Yitzhaki (1972) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986), we assume penalties to
be proportional to the tax that is deemed to have been evaded and let   0 denote the
penalty per unit of tax evaded. Consequently, compared to the outcome under compli-
ance, purchasing the scheme will increase disposable income by () if the taxpayer is
not deemed to be evading tax, but will reduce it by () if the taxpayer is deemed to
be evading tax. Assuming that taxpayers are risk neutral, the expected value of purchas-
ing a scheme will be  (), where  =  (1¡  (1 + )). Obviously, we need to assume
that   0 to ensure that any scheme is purchased. Given the low coverage rates (audit
probabilities) operated by most tax authorities, this is an innocuous assumption.
In summary, there is thus a single type of scheme available and its properties are
summarised by parameter , giving the expected net percentage reduction in tax through
purchasing a scheme.9
For the moment, we will assume that the scheme being sold is a generic/o¤-the-peg
scheme that could be purchased and implemented by any taxpayer. In this case, the
seller of the scheme will know nothing about the characteristics of the purchaser and,
in particular, his income, , and cannot charge di¤erent prices for di¤erent taxpayers –
i.e. engage in price discrimination. In Section 4.2 we will consider the alternative case
where sellers provide a bespoke service through which they learn the taxpayer’s income
and thus can o¤er a schedule of prices that varies with income.
Thus, let us assume for the moment that sellers of this scheme are unable to observe
the individual incomes of the taxpayers who buy them. Therefore, schemes will be sold
on the market at a common price   0 which takes the form of an up-front fee. Clearly,
9So far, we have assumed  to be independent of income. In section 4, this assumption will be relaxed,
and we will investigate how equilibrium tax compliance depends on the progressivity of the tax evasion
technology, (); the audit probability, (); and the penalty function, ().
7
they will only be bought by those taxpayers with an income above the critical threshold
() de…ned by
 (()) =  (1)
2.1.2 Aggregate Demand
It follows from (1) that when the price is  the fraction of taxpayers who buy the scheme
– i.e. aggregate demand – will be
 = 1¡  [()]  0 ·  · 1
As is common, it useful to work with the inverse aggregate demand function. So, let ()
be the critical level of income above which taxpayers will have to buy a scheme in order
to give rise to aggregate demand, . Then, () is implicitly de…ned by
 ´ 1¡  [()]  0 ·  · 1 (2)
and so

0() = ¡ 1
 (())
 (3)
Consequently, the inverse aggregate demand function is
() ´  (()) (4)
with

0 () = ¡
0()
()
 0 (5)
2.2 Supply Side
As indicated in the introduction, we will assume that the tax advice industry is best
described as an imperfectly competitive oligopoly, comprising a small number of large
…rms.
There are  ¸ 1 identical …rms supplying the given type of scheme.
The tax minimization industry could be compared with the research and development
sector. To provide an e¤ective tax reduction scheme, suppliers must conduct complex
research into local and international tax law, devise a scheme and then “test” it by seeking
a legal opinion as to whether it works in law. Since, by assumption, we are dealing with
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marketed rather than bespoke schemes, once devised, the marginal cost of producing an
additional version of the scheme is pretty minimal.10
Accordingly, we assume that any given …rm has a technology represented by the cost
function
 () =  +  (6)
where  is the …xed cost and  is the marginal cost.
To have an interesting story, we assume that the marginal costs are su¢ciently low
so that, if schemes were available at a price equal to the marginal cost, some consumers
would be willing to buy them. Formally, we assume there to exist a level of income ,
     such that

¡

¢
=  (7)
Notice that  is the minimum level of income above which individuals would purchase a
scheme if the tax advice industry were perfectly competitive.
For later purposes, it will be helpful to re-write (7) as

¡

¢
=  =


 (8)
where  is the ratio of distribution costs to the expected bene…t of acquiring a scheme
and can be considered as measuring the e¤ectiveness of the tax supply industry.
In the case where the supply industry is imperfectly competitive, we assume that
…rms compete in quantities, let  be the output chosen by a typical …rm and ¡ denote
the output of all other …rms – so that aggregate output is  =  + ¡.
We do not assume a particular form of competition in the market. Rather, we adopt
a conjectural variation approach11 whereby each …rm assumes that if it increases output
10Remember that we can have the same model allowing the cost to vary with the tax duties of the
customer, with the assumption that this cost will be transferred to the tax avoider ex post.
11The concept of conjectural variation was introduced by Bowley (1924) and since then, it has been
used by economists to explain more diversi…ed market outcomes rather than restricted Nash equilibrium
prices or outputs. To narrow down its too broad and arbitrary predictions, many researchers have focused
on the rationality and consistency of conjectural variation (see Laitner, 1980; Bresnahan 1981; Kamien
and Schwartz, 1983; Robson, 1983; Ulph 1983). Despite theoretical objections to the concept, empirical
evidence provides widespread support for the phenomenon (see Iwata, 1974; Appelbaum 1979; Just and
Chern, 1980; Kolstad and Wolak, 1986). Then, a natural question arises: how does conjectural variation
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by one unit, the total output of all remaining …rms will change by the amount ,12 that
is
¡

= ¡ 0 ·   1 (9)
Cournot competition arises when  = 0 and perfect/Bertrand competition when
 = 1. Notice, however, that we are excluding the uninteresting Bertrand equilibrium,
where the price would just be driven down to the marginal cost and no …rm would make
a pro…t.
From (5) and (6), the pro…ts made by a typical …rm are
¦
¡
 
¡¢ = ()¡  ¡  (10)
From (9) and (10), it follows that the equilibrium fraction of taxpayers who purchase
a scheme, , is characterised by
( ()¡ ) + 1




0 () = 0 (11)
where  = 
1¡ ¸ 1 measures the competitiveness of the industry.
In what follows, we assume that we have a non-trivial equilibrium in which   0 so
there are some non-compliant taxpayers and the equilibrium price of a scheme is above
the marginal cost.
Equation (11) is the standard result, characterising the equilibrium of a homogenous
good oligopoly.
The equilibrium will depend on three factors: marginal costs, ; competitiveness of the
industry, ; and the nature of the demand schedule. Indeed, we know from Anderson and
Regis (2003) that the equilibrium will depend on the convexity of the aggregate demand
function.
From (4), we can see that the aggregate demand schedule in turn depends on the
nature of both the tax schedule and the distribution of income. To more clearly bring
out how these underlying factors in‡uence the equilibrium, substitute (2), (4), (5) into
a¤ect market performance? Anderson (1977), Kamien and Schwartz (1983) and Kolstad and Wolak
(1986) found that higher conjectural variation leads to lower output and higher prices.
12In the special case of monopoly, where  = 1 and there are no other …rms, we make the natural
assumption that  = 0.
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(11), and then, after some rearrangements, we can also see that the equilibrium cut-o¤
level of income above which taxpayers purchase a scheme, , is characterised by
 () =  +
1


0 ()
1¡  ()
 ()
0
 (12)
From (7), (12) and our assumption that   0 it follows that  ()   and that
 ·   , with  =  in a special case of perfect/Bertrand competition.
To derive comparative static results, it is useful to establish an alternative way of
characterising the equilibrium. Accordingly, let us de…ne the function
() = (()¡ )1 [1¡  ()]  (13)
Proposition 1 There exists a unique  which solves (12) such that  = max(argmax())
Moreover,      and therefore ()  013
Proposition 1 de…nes the equilibrium threshold income which splits the population
into fully compliant taxpayers and non-compliant taxpayers who use a tax minimisa-
tion scheme and, consequently, though equation (2) the proportion, , of the taxpayer
population that is non-compliant.
 provides one measure of the amount of non-compliance in the economy.
Another measure of non-compliance is the tax gap – the amount of uncollected tax.
This can, in gross terms, be de…ned as the amount of tax that taxpayers initially try not
to pay and, once more expressed in absolute terms, this would be
 = (1¡ )
Z

 ()()
Alternatively, the tax gap can be de…ned in net terms as the amount of tax that
taxpayers ultimately succeed in not paying after the e¤ects of audit and repayment are
taken into account and, once more expressed in absolute terms, this would be
 = (1¡ )(1¡ )
Z

()()
13In general, there could be in…mum solutions to problem (12) and they will all belong to arg max().
However, we restrict our attention to the solution that is most preferable to the government,  =
max(arg max()).
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Each of these can also be measured in relative terms as a fraction of the total amount
of tax that would have been collected had all taxpayers been fully compliant.
Whatever measure is used, factors such as the risk of being found to be non-compliant,
, the shape of the tax schedule  () and the distribution of income () will a¤ect the
tax gap through two channels:
² there is the direct impact, treating  as constant;
² there is an indirect or behavioural e¤ect that works through the impact of these
factors on 
In all that follows, we want to purely focus on these indirect or behavioural e¤ects
and, consequently, on changes in the value of . So, although we will establish a series
of comparative static propositions about the e¤ects of various parameter changes on the
number of non-compliant taxpayers, these also tell us about the qualitative indirect e¤ects
of these changes on the tax gap.14
Remark 1 From (13), it follows that there are …ve factors that will generate comparative
static e¤ects:
² the marginal cost per client, ;
² the e¢ciency of the tax saving scheme, ;
² the competitiveness of the tax advice industry, ;
² the nature of the tax schedule, ();
² the nature of the distribution of income,  ().
In the next section, we establish the comparative static results relating to all these
…ve factors.
14The behavioural e¤ect is of great importance per se. A low tax discipline reduces the e¤ectiveness
of tax audit, increases the costs of tax enforcement and, as mentioned before, undermines the social
norms of tax compliance. It may even stimulate strategic tax con-compliance as discussed in Bassetto
and Phelan (2008).
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3 Comparative Static Results
3.1 General discussion
In this section, we establish the main comparative static results of the paper. We will
make repeated use of the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that e() = ()() where () is positive, continuously dif-
ferentiable and 0()  0 , then for the corresponding pair e  de…ned as in Proposition
1, it follows that e   and so, e  .
In the rest of the paper, we will investigate how the change of one of the factors de-
scribed in Remark 1 will a¤ect the function () and the proportion of honest taxpayers.
In particular, we would like to establish how changes in the tax code or in the un-
derlying distribution of income that will a¤ect the distribution of the tax burden a¤ect
the proportion of non-compliant taxpayers. For this purpose, we would like to relate
the monotonicity of the function () = e()() introduced in Proposition 2 to the
Lorenz dominance criterion for the distribution of incomes.
Lorenz dominance, introduced in Atkinson (1970), is one of the most popular order-
ings of inequality. Atkinson demonstrated that if the Lorenz curve (which shows the
proportion of total income received by the poorest % of the population) for one distrib-
ution lies below the Lorenz curve associated with another, inequality in the …rst case is
higher for a wide class of inequality measures.
Naturally, it is somewhat cumbersome to construct the Lorenz curve every time we
need to compare the inequality resulting from di¤erent income distributions. So, we need
a test whereby we can guarantee that one income distribution Lorenz dominates another
without having to compute the associated Lorenz curves. Now, one way of reducing
inequality is to carry out a progressive redistribution. That is, if we transform income in
such a way that the rate of increase in income is smaller for a richer than for a poorer
person, the new Lorenz curve will lie above the old one and the two Lorenz curves do not
intersect.
This idea is formalised in the following Lemma which was proved in Kakwani (1977)
and Jakobsson (1976) for a continuous domain and di¤erentiable income transformation,
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and in Keen, Papapanagos and Shorrocks (2000) for a discrete income distribution. For
proof in a more general set-up, see Le Breton, Moyes and Trannoy (1996) or Damjanovic
(2005), which provides a simpler proof.
Lemma 1 Let () and () be a positive non-decreasing function transforming income
. Then, () is more equally distributed than () i¤ ()
()
is a decreasing function.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 provide the basis for showing the conceptual relation
between distributional inequality, the function () and hence, the equilibrium amount
of tax non-compliance. We spell this out in the rest of the section.
3.2 Higher Marginal Costs and Lower Net Bene…t
There are many factors that can cause the marginal costs of providing schemes to vary.
Like any technology, this will be subject to technical progress and knowledge spillover.
For example, ideas developed in the US for lowering tax may, with some adaptation, be
applicable to the UK. On the other hand, we could envisage a tax authority introducing
legislation such as disclosure powers, which make it more di¢cult for the tax advice
industry to market e¤ective schemes. This could show up as an increase in the marginal
costs of distributing a scheme, , since it may require more e¤ort to …ne-tune the scheme
to each customer’s circumstances.
Clearly, there is a number of steps that a tax authority can take to increase the risk
of successful challenge, , and the penalty on evasion , both of which will reduce the
net bene…t of a scheme, .
Both increases in marginal costs, , and reductions in the net bene…t,  will show up
as an increase in costs relative to bene…t  = 

and, intuitively, this will result in a higher
equilibrium price for schemes and, consequently, a higher critical income threshold above
which schemes are bought,  and thus, a smaller number of non-compliant taxpayers.
Formally, we have:
Proposition 3 If e   then e   and so e  
Proof. e() = h ()¡ ei1 [1¡  ()] = ()() where () = h ()¡
()¡
i1
.
It is easily seen that () is a strictly increasing function and the result follows from
Proposition 2.
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3.3 Increased competition
Our model of competition is very general and nests as special cases:
² Monopoly:  = 1,  = 0 ;
² Cournot oligopoly:   1,  = 0 ;
² Bertrand equilibrium (approximately):   1,  ¼ 1 ;
Therefore, it is interesting to ask how the equilibrium is a¤ected when there is an
increased degree of competition in the sense of either an increase in the number of …rms,
, serving the market, or an increase in the intensity of price competition, . These will
both have the e¤ect of increasing the parameter  = 
1¡ and, as in conventional models
of oligopoly, these will drive down the equilibrium price and expand equilibrium output,
thus leading to less compliance.15 This is con…rmed in the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 If the industry supplying tax advice becomes more competitive, the pro-
portion of non-compliant taxpayers will increase. Formally, if e   then e   and soe  .
Proof. e() = ()() where () = ( ()¡ ) 1¡ 1 . It is easily seen that 0()  0
and the result follows from Proposition 2.
3.4 Tax Progressivity and Compliance
In this section, we establish a link between the progressivity of the tax schedule, (),
and the proportion of taxpayers who are non-compliant.
15Now, a particular interpretation of our model is one in which corrupt tax organisations or o¢cials
o¤er tax grants and exemptions for particular …rms in return for a bribe, with the case of a monopolistic
corrupt o¢cial being similar to that described in Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Proposition 3 shows that
to increase compliance, the government should reduce the degree of competition in the tax minimizing
industry. For example, the right to issue tax grants and tax exemptions should only be given to one
authority. Our prescriptions are the opposite of those in Shleifer and Vishny (1993). This is because
Shleifer and Vishny’s paper addresses the situation where bureaucrats are bribed to provide some socially
valuable goods, whilst we are investigating the production of tax avoidance, which is a "social bad".
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Now, one weak sense of progressivity relates to how unequally the tax burden is
distributed. At one extreme, a poll tax makes everyone pay the same amount of tax
while, under a progressive tax system, the rich pay more tax than the poor. We capture
this idea through the following de…nition.
De…nition 1 We will say that the tax duties e are less equally distributed than  ifh
()
()
i0
 0 .
De…nition 1 is consistent with the Lorenz dominance criterion for the distribution of
tax duties, as discussed in Section 3.1.
The …rst and most general proposition we can establish that connects the shape of
the tax schedule to the level of compliance relates to the distribution of the pro…ts made
by tax advisers from di¤erent taxpayers:  (()¡ ).
De…nition 2 We will say that the tax code e results in a less equally distributed tax
adviser pro…t than  if 0()  0 where () =
h
()¡
()¡
i

Then, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Let
h
()¡
()¡
i0
be positive so that e   and so that e  .
This is an immediate corollary of Proposition 2.
For the interesting case where all costs of producing a tax scheme are purely the
…xed costs of "R&D" and the marginal cost of distributing the scheme is zero – so that
 =  = 0 – there is an immediate link between the distribution of tax adviser pro…ts
and the distribution of tax burdens, namely progressivity.
The following proposition shows that in this case, the proportion of compliant tax
payers is higher when the tax duties are less equally distributed.
Corollary 1 Let
h
()
()
i0
be positive and assume that the per client cost is zero,  = 0,
then e   and so e  .
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The intuition is the following. The move to a more progressive tax system will raise
the average tax rate – and hence the willingness to pay for a scheme – of supra marginal
consumers. The industry will accordingly increase pro…ts by increasing the price of tax
schemes and catering more for high demand consumers – thus reducing the number of
schemes sold.
Remark 2 As noted above, it follows that having less equally distributed tax revenues
will reduce the tax gap through the indirect e¤ect. Naturally, it does not follow from this
proposition that the overall e¤ect on the tax gap will be negative. Although there are fewer
non-compliant taxpayers, these will typically be liable for a larger amount of tax, so the
total amount of tax underpaid could either rise or fall.
So far, we have considered very general tax codes e() and  () but we have been
able to get sharp propositions relating their relative progressivity to the levels of compli-
ance they induce only in the case where the marginal costs are zero. When the marginal
costs are positive, Proposition 5 still allows us to establish an important link between
tax progressivity and tax compliance, provided that we con…ne ourselves to a¢ne trans-
formations of tax codes and provided that the increase in progressivity is su¢ciently
high.
De…nition 3 The tax code e () is a progressive a¢ne transformation of the tax code
() if e () = ()¡  where   0   1
Proposition 6 A progressive a¢ne transformation of the tax code reduces the proportion
of non-compliant tax payers
³ e  ´ i¤ 
¡1  
Corollary 2 If e() = ()¡  where   0   1 it is easily shown that h()¡
()¡
i0
=
 0()(¡1)
(()¡)2
³

¡1 ¡ 
´
 0 The result follows from Proposition 2.
Proposition 6 shows that an increase in tax progressivity could improve the tax dis-
cipline. As in the above remark, this does not necessarily imply an increase in the tax
gap.
The reason for having to ensure that the increase in progressivity is su¢ciently large
is as follows. In general, the ratio of tax adviser pro…ts under the two tax codes can be
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represented as
h
()¡
()¡
i
= ()¡
()
()
()
()
()¡  If   0 the …rst term is strictly increasing
in  and, following De…nition 1, so is the second term provided that the tax code e()
is more progressive than  () – i.e. produces more unequal tax burdens. However, if
  0, the third term is strictly decreasing in . To ensure that tax adviser pro…ts are
more unequally distributed, we have to ensure that the increase in progressivity of the
tax code as re‡ected in 
¡1 is high relative to .
So far, we have compared the levels of compliance under two tax codes that di¤er in
their degree of progressivity, but we have made no assumptions about the amount of tax
raised under these two schedules. However, often in comparing tax codes we do so under
the assumption of revenue neutrality – i.e. that they raise the same amount of tax, or at
least would do so if all taxpayers were fully compliant. Assume now that the government
carries out an a¢ne tax reform which, if all tax-payers were fully compliant, would be
revenue neutral and would result in a more progressive tax schedule: a higher marginal
tax rate, lower taxes for the poor and higher taxes for the rich. So e () =  () ¡ 
  1   0 and
 :=
Z

e ()() = Z

()() (14)
where  is the average amount of tax that would be raised in the case of full compliance.
Condition (14) would imply that  = (¡1) . Therefore, in this case 0() =
h
()¡
()¡
i0
=
(¡ 1)  0()
(()¡)2 ( ¡ ) which is positive if and only if    =  () This latter result
requires that the average bene…t from tax non compliance exceeds the marginal cost of
supply or, equivalently, that the individual with average tax duties would be involved
in tax non-compliance should the tax avoidance market be perfectly competitive. We
formulate this result in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 The move to a more progressive tax system will reduce the proportion of
non-compliant taxpayers if, had the industry supplying tax advice been perfectly competi-
tive, the minimum level of income above which all taxpayers are non-compliant is below
the income of the individual with average tax duties. Formally, the result is:
e ?  as  () 7  
NOTE 1: Another way of stating this result is to say that the impact of an increase in
tax progressivity on tax discipline depends on how high is the marginal cost of distributing
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the tax scheme, , in relation to the bene…t that a taxpayer paying the average amount
of tax will obtain from acquiring a scheme to reduce taxes. If the cost is not very high,
   then a revenue-neutral tax reform that makes the tax system more progressive
will result in better tax discipline – fewer people engaging in non-compliance.
NOTE 2: Although the condition for the conclusion to hold refers to the critical
threshold level of income when the supply industry is perfectly competitive, the result
holds for any degree of competitiveness.
One implication of this remark is that if the industry is imperfectly competitive, it
will not always be possible to tell whether the condition of the theorem holds just by
using observations on which taxpayers are actually non-compliant in the given situation.
However, one case where we can say something more de…nite is as follows:
Corollary 3 If there are non-compliant taxpayers with below-average tax duties then
the move to a more progressive tax system will reduce the proportion of non-compliant
taxpayers. Formally, if  ()   then e  .
Proof. Since  ()   () it follows that if  ()   then ()   and the
conclusion follows from Proposition.7
NOTE 3 If the assumption of Corollary 3 holds and the marginal cost is high,
an increase in progressivity will tend to increase non-compliance both in the sense that
the proportion of non-compliant taxpayers increases and that the total underpayment of
taxes – the tax gap – will increase.
To conclude this subsection, note that the conclusions of both Proposition 6 and
Proposition 7 question the widely held belief that moving towards a ‡atter, less pro-
gressive tax code will reduce the amount of non-compliance. Thus, a reduction in the
marginal tax rate for the highest tax bracket is often recommended as a means of reduc-
ing the incentives for tax avoidance and evasion (see, for example, Tanzi and Zee, 2000).
However, the present model illustrates that this policy may result in the completely op-
posite outcome,16 in the case where the marginal cost per client of supplying a scheme is
relatively small.
16Indeed, exactly such an outcome was reported in Russia in 2002. Starting from 2001, the Russian
government cut the pro…t tax rate from 35 to 25 percent and broadened the tax base by revoking
investment preferences, which made the tax duties more equally distributed. By implementing this
measure, the Russian government intended to reduce the incentives for tax avoidance and tax evasion.
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3.5 Income Inequality and Compliance
In this section, we will show that in a wide class of cases, a more equal distribution of
the tax base may be associated with a higher rate of tax non-compliance.
Consider two di¤erent distributions of income on the interval [ ] with the cumulative
distribution functions  () and e () Let us also de…ne the survival probability ratio of
these two distributions as () = 1¡
 ()
1¡ ()  From Proposition 2, we immediately get the
following result:
Proposition 8 Consider the survival probability ratio () = 1¡
 ()
1¡ ()  If 
0()  0 then
for any tax code  (), the income distribution  () will imply a higher level of tax non-
compliance than e () i.e.   e
Proof. Propositions 1 and 2 immediately give us the su¢cient condition for increasing
the indirect e¤ect of tax non-compliance.
To relate this proposition to income inequality, let () = ()[1¡ ()] and e() =e()[1 ¡ e ()] be the hazard rates associated with the two distributions. Now, it is
immediately obvious that 0() = ()
h
()¡ e()i and thus, () has a positive …rst
derivative if and only if, for all , the distribution  () has a higher hazard rate than
the distribution e () We say that in this case, the distribution  () is smaller than the
distribution e () with respect to hazard order.17
To relate hazard-rate dominance to Lorenz dominance, we …rst note that in Une
and Saijo (1995) it was shown that if there are two distributions on the same interval
[ ], then the hazard-rate dominance of the …rst distribution over the second implies
a …rst-order stochastic dominance of the …rst over the second. But …rst-order stochastic
dominance implies second-order stochastic dominance, which we know from the work
of Atkinson and Bourgignon (1989) to be equivalent to Generalised Lorenz dominance.
So higher hazard rates are associated with both a higher level of non-compliance and
However, the ratio of taxable pro…t to total pro…t fell from 60 to 30 percent in one year, as reported
in Gurvitch (2002). This phenomenon is hard to explain using existing tax minimizing models. This
paper provides a possible explanation – the key innovation being that we treat the price of tax reduction
schemes as endogenous.
17See Muller and Dietrich (2002) for a further discussion on hazard rate ordering.
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a greater level of equality, at least as measured by the Generalised Lorenz dominance
criterion. This is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 For any tax code  () if the income distribution  () hazard-rate domi-
nates the distribution e (), then  () will exhibit both a higher level of tax non-compliance
and a greater degree of equality as determined by the Generalised Lorenz dominance cri-
terion.
Generalised Lorenz dominance is now equivalent to Lorenz dominance only if the
means of the income distributions are the same. Although there is not such a close
link between hazard rate dominance and Lorenz dominance, there is nevertheless a wide
family of income distributions for which an increase in the variance will imply both
an increase in inequality as measured by the Lorenz dominance criterion and a higher
hazard rate and hence, from Proposition 8, a lower rate of tax non-compliance. Among
these distributions are those commonly used in the literature for approximating actual
distributions of income: e.g. Pareto distribution, Lognormal distribution and Exponential
distribution. This is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 10 For any tax code (), if the income distribution  () is either Pareto
or Exponential, then an increase in the variance will result in both higher inequality in
terms of Lorenz dominance and a lower hazard rate and hence, from Proposition 8, also
a higher proportion of non-compliant taxpayers. The same conclusions hold for a mean
preserving increase in variance for the Lognormal distribution.
Finally, we note that there is a link between the result of this sub-section and that
of the previous sub-section. They both demonstrate that a more equal distribution of
tax duties can lead to a greater level of non-compliance. In the previous section, the
greater equality of tax duties was caused by a less progressive tax system whereas in this
sub-section, the root cause is more equal distribution of pre-tax incomes. To formalise
this idea, we need the following de…nition:
De…nition 4 An increasing income transformation () equalizes tax burdens with re-
spect to tax code () on interval [ ], if (())
()
is decreasing on ( )
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From the de…nition, any income transformation which equalizes tax burdens makes
tax duties more equal according to the Lorenz ordering. The following proposition states
that an income transformation which is equalizing with respect to tax code would reduce
the share of compliant tax payers.
Proposition 11 Let () equalize tax burdens with respect to tax code () Then, if
 = 0 threshold equilibrium  is smaller than () which implies a larger number of
non-compliant taxpayers.
Proof. The relation between the old and new income distributions would be as
follows: () =  (¡1 ()), where ¡1 is an inverted function of  We recall that
 = argmax() = [ ()]
1 [1¡ ()]  Substituting  = ¡1() we obtain

 = argmax (())
1
(1¡  ())
= argmax()()
where  = ¡1() and () =
h
(())
()
i1
 If () equalizes tax burdens, () is a
decreasing function and we may apply Proposition 2 and conclude that    This
means that  · () and the share of non-compliant tax payers increases.
Proposition 11 proves that equalizing tax burdens with respect to tax income transfor-
mation may reduce the number of tax payers. For a simple proportional tax (())
()
= ()

and thus, there is a one-to-one link between the equality of pre-tax income i and the equal-
ity of tax burdens. Thus, increasing inequality as determined by the Lorenz dominance
criterion may improve the indirect e¤ect of tax compliance.
As a special case, consider the linear tax schedule  () =  ¡  0    1 and
suppose that we make the mean-preserving equalising transformation of income () =
 + (1 ¡ ) 0    1. Then, the distribution of tax duties implied by this new
distribution of pre-tax income is equivalent to that which would have been created had we
alternatively introduced a new revenue-neutral tax reform to produce the tax schedulee() = e ¡ e where e =    and e =  ¡ (1 ¡ )   – which is a less
progressive tax schedule. The implications for compliance can then be determined by
applying Proposition 7.
In summary, our model predicts that pre-tax income inequality and tax compliance
can be positively related. Similar conclusions have been obtained by Cowell (1992), albeit
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through a very di¤erent mechanism since in his model, inequality a¤ects household utility
through the costs of tax evasion.
In this section, we have shown how the degree of inequality of tax duties a¤ects the
level of compliance. In particular, we have shown that more equally distributed tax
duties may reduce tax compliance. The inequality of tax duties can be related to both
the distribution of pre-tax income and the progressivity of the tax schedule. In the next
section, we show how the design of the penalty and monitoring functions can also a¤ect
the distribution of rewards to taxpayers from purchasing tax schemes and hence, the
level of compliance. This implies that any changes in compliance created by shifts in the
pre-tax distribution of income can be o¤set by changes in shapes of the penalty and/or
monitoring functions.
4 Two extensions
4.1 Monitoring, Punishment and Non-Compliance Technology
So far, we have assumed that:
² schemes o¤er taxpayers the opportunity to save a fraction of their tax, , which is
independent of income, ;
² the probability that a scheme is subject to a successful challenge, , is independent
of income;
² the fraction of tax evaded that has to be paid as a penalty if a taxpayer’s scheme,
 is e¤ectively challenged is also independent of income.
In principle, each of these assumptions may be invalid.
² The opportunities for non-compliance may vary with income. While, in principle,
this could go either way, it is likely that the greater is a taxpayer’s income – and
hence the greater the amount of tax due – the greater will be the opportunities for
tax reduction. This suggests that an alternative assumption is that the fraction of
tax saved by a scheme is an increasing function of income, 0()  0.
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² The tax authorities can, in principle, choose how to deploy audit resources across
di¤erent taxpayer groups and can thus choose a challenge schedule () that varies
with income. Typically, they will target their audit resources more heavily on
taxpayer groups which o¤er higher potential returns. Everything else equal, this
would suggest that the monitoring function that is often used will be such that
0()  0.
² In a similar spirit, the tax authorities may often negotiate settlements with tax-
payers whereby they may not impose the full penalty  that is legally available to
them. For this and other reasons, we want to recognise that there is a de facto
penalty schedule ()  0 that could vary with income.
For all these reasons, the expected net fraction of tax saved by purchasing a scheme
is likely to vary with income – which we capture through the equation
() = ()f1¡ ()[1 + ()]g
It is then an immediate implication of Proposition 2 that, ceteris paribus, tax compli-
ance is higher when the share of taxes saved grows with income at a faster rate. Formally,
we have
Proposition 12 If e() = ()(), where 0()  0 then e   and e  
Proof. Immediate application of Proposition 2.
This gives rise to three obvious corollaries.
Corollary 4 Ceteris paribus, the proportion of compliant tax payers is higher when the
opportunities for tax saving,  increase more rapidly with income.
As in some previous remarks, note that this does not imply that the tax gap will be
smaller, since the higher percentage of compliant taxpayers is being o¤set by the fact
that the non-compliant individuals are paying a smaller proportion of their taxes.
Corollaries 5 and 6 claim that the government can increase its tax collection by making
monitoring and penalty functions more regressive, more frequently monitoring low income
tax units and more heavily punishing them for tax evasion than the tax units with higher
incomes.
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Corollary 5 Ceteris paribus, for income independent punishment  (0 = 0) tax com-
pliance is higher when the probability of audit is a more rapidly decreasing function of
income, e0  0.
Proof. We can prove this by a direct di¤erentiation of () where () = 1¡()[1+]
1¡()[1+]
so that
(log )0

=
(1 + )
¡e0 ¡ 0¢
(1¡ e [1 + ]) (1¡  [1 + ])  0
Corollary 6 Ceteris paribus, for income independent audit probability  (0 = 0), tax
compliance is higher when the tax penalty is a more rapidly decreasing function of income,e0  0
Proof. We can prove this by direct di¤erentiation of () where () = 1¡()[1+]
1¡()[1+]
so that
(log )0

=

³e0 ¡ 0´³
1¡ 
h
1 + ei´ (1¡  [1 + ])  0
4.2 Alternative pricing behaviour
So far, we have assumed that sellers of a scheme are unable to observe the income of their
clients and thus sell a scheme at a …xed price  that takes the form of an up-front fee.
However, an alternative assumption might be that sellers can observe the taxable
income of their clients, which opens up much richer pricing possibilities. For example,
sellers may charge a combination of an up-front fee plus a share of the tax saved. But
this raises the question of who bears the risk if the scheme fails and the taxpayer has
to repay the tax and pay a penalty. Buyers might reasonably argue that if sellers take
a share of the gains when their schemes work, they should also take a share of the cost
when they fail to work.
Accordingly in what follows, we will assume that advisers make schemes available on
a two-part tari¤ de…ned by ( )   0 0    1, whereby the expected amount paid
for a scheme by a taxpayer with income  is  (1¡ ) + (). We can consider  as an
entry fee or a reserve price that must be paid by the taxpayer to purchase the scheme, and
25
 as the fraction of the expected gain18 (net the reserve price) from buying the scheme
that the taxpayer must share with the seller. We will take  as …xed and determined by
exogenous factors that determine the (common) bargaining power between the buyer and
the seller over how to share the gains from the scheme.
Bargaining is an extensively used model in the tax evasion literature, investigating
the activities of a corrupt tax inspector who audits the individual’s true income, but can
be bribed into misreporting the audit result to the government.19 However, we believe
the introduction of a reserve price to enrichen the model. The reserve price contract can
easily be written, does not require any additional e¤ort and, since the supplier can always
set a zero reserve price, it increases the gain of the supplier. Finally, this type of contract
is widely implemented as a wage contract for high-skilled professionals. A bargaining
model with a reserve price was …rst introduced by Wang (1995).
We will continue to assume that all schemes are perfect substitutes and thus, in
equilibrium, must be sold at the same entry fee, . It is easily seen that an individual
will buy a scheme i¤
() ¸  (15)
4.2.1 Aggregate Demand
If  schemes are to be sold in aggregate then, as previously, the critical income that
will create this will be  () de…ned by  = 1 ¡  [ ()]  so that 0 () = ¡ 1
 0[()] 
Consequently, the common entry fee consistent with selling  schemes in aggregate is
() = ( ()) But then, the revenue earned by the scheme developer when schemes
are sold is
() = (1¡ )( ()) + 
Z
()
 ()() (16)
and thus, the marginal revenue is

0() = (1¡ ) ( ())¡ (1¡ )
0( ())
 [ ()]
+  ( ()) (17)
=  ( ())¡ (1¡ )
0( ())
 [ ()]
 (18)
18Thus, sellers share with buyers both the gains from the schemes when they are successful and the
losses when unsuccessful. That is, there is full risk sharing.
19See Chander and Wilde (1992) and Hindriks et al (1999).
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4.2.2 Firm Behaviour
As previously, the …rst-order condition for the revenue maximisation problem (18) is
equivalent to the …rst-order condition of the problem

 = max(argmax()) (19)
where we de…ne
() = [()]1¡ [1¡  ()] 
which is exactly the same as (13) except that the concentration parameter  is replaced
by the bargaining strength parameter 1¡ . We then have the following result, which is
just a re-interpretation of Proposition 4.
Proposition 13 If the bargaining power of sellers increases, so will the proportion of
non-compliant taxpayers.
However, there are reasons to believe that there is a signi…cant market of tax evasion
and avoidance schemes, where suppliers have a negligible bargaining power even in the
absence of competition. In many cases, the value of the bribes paid to obtain tax ex-
emption is signi…cantly lower than the associated cost for the government budget. For
example, in New York, according to the Gotham Gazette (2002), some 18 current and
former city tax assessors accepted millions of dollars in bribes to improperly reduce the
tax rates on at least 500 properties. Corruption costs the city as much as $1 billion. The
di¤erences between the value of bribes and the amount of taxes not paid as a result are
so huge that it may be di¢cult to assume any kind of bargaining.20
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have modelled the tax advice industry which adjusts the supply of tax
reduction schemes in response to changes in aggregate demand. Within this model, we
20Another potential illustration might be the Land…ll tax scandal in the UK. According to The
Guardian, a government appointed regulator, which polices the probity of £ 280m in tax credits given
to thousands of UK environmental bodies, paid its directors over £ 100,000 in fees for two years without
authorization.
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have shown how levels of compliance respond to a number of factors including the pro-
gressivity of the tax schedule and the distribution of taxable income. We have shown that
it is extremely important to take this endogenous supply into account since it produces
conclusions that run counter to much of the existing literature, but can also help explain
phenomena that are otherwise hard to explain with existing models. For example, we
have argued that a reduction in inequality or a decrease in tax progressiveness may re-
sult in a fall of the share of compliant taxpayers. Further, we have provided arguments
against the reduction in the highest marginal tax rate as a policy directed at improving
tax discipline.
We have also shown that when the government is reluctant to impose a more progres-
sive tax code, it can still make tax evasion demand less equally distributed by designing a
proper audit and punishment function. Finally, we have shown that our results are robust
to the assumption on market structure, since they have been proved for Cournot game
quantity competition with conjectural variation and a bargaining model with a reserve
price.
A signi…cant limitation of the model is the assumption that there is just one type of
tax scheme. Ulph (2007) extends the model to the case with many tax schemes ranging
from tax planning through tax avoidance to tax evasion, each with very di¤erent risk
pro…les and expected payo¤s. However, in his model, there is perfect competition so
prices are exogenous and determined by costs.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 Suppose e() = ()() where () and () are positive, di¤er-
entiable and 0()  0 Suppose  = argmax(); e = argmax e() Then e  .
Proof. Let us assume the contrary, e   Since () is a strictly increasing
function, it follows that
()  (e) (20)
28
By de…nition, e = argmax e() and therefore
e(e)  e() (21)
Inequalities (20) and (21) imply e(e)(e)  e()() which is exactly as (e) 
(), which is a contradiction since, by de…nition,  = argmax() So the assumption
is incorrect and e >  The equality is not possible either. Let e = . Then, e 0()
shall be equal to zero. However, e 0() =  0()()+()0() = ()0()  0
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